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Author Background 
 
Since 2009, the research project, Abandoned Mines in Northern Canada, has studied the social, 
environmental, and economic impacts of historic mines on Aboriginal communities in northern 
Canada. The work has been funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada (SSHRC) and conducted by independent scholars based primarily in the Departments of 
History and Geography at Memorial University, with co-investigators at the Universities of Winnipeg 
and Manitoba. Our research has focused on the study of archival documents and oral history 
research related to five major case studies:  
 Giant Mine, NWT;  
 Port Radium/Eastern Great Bear Lake District, NWT; 
 Pine Point Mine, NWT;  
 Keno Hill Silver District, Yukon;  
 Labrador/Quebec Iron-ore District. 
 
In 2012 we received funding from SSHRC to expand our work on Giant Mine as part of the new Toxic 
Legacies Project. Specifically, we have formed partnerships with local groups such as Alternatives 
North and the Goyatiko Language Society to produce publically accessible material (videos, reports, 
films, etc.) on the history of Giant Mine and how to communicate with future generations about the 
long term legacies of arsenic at the site. This report was co-produced by the researchers at Memorial 
University in partnership with Kevin O’Reilly of Alternatives North (a coalition of social justice and 
environmental groups in Yellowknife). For more information, please visit our website.   
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Summary: Communicating with Future Generations at Giant Mine 
 
The Giant Mine Remediation Plan proposes to freeze 237,000 tons of toxic arsenic trioxide dust where it 
is currently stored underground. It is likely that water pumping, monitoring, and maintenance at the site 
will be necessary for a very long time to prevent the arsenic from seeping into the local environment. 
The recent environmental assessment of the project requires ongoing research into a permanent 
solution to the arsenic problem at Giant Mine within a 100 year time frame. Despite this, a century is a 
very long time (people have forgotten about toxic sites over shorter periods), and there is no guarantee 
that technology can be developed to safely remove all arsenic from the site.  
 
A system to communicate with future generations about the arsenic hazards will reduce the risk people 
will forget about the site. Such a system should have two goals: 
 
 To warn future generations about the hazards from arsenic at the site 
 To ensure future generations have all required information to properly maintain the site (and 
also the knowledge to not damage existing equipment such as the thermosyphons). 
 
Designing such a communication system involves many challenges. One of the most difficult is to 
imagine who your audience might be. What languages will they speak? What level of technical 
knowledge will they have? Will they have the resources to maintain the site? 
 
A great deal of work has been done on communicating with future generations at nuclear waste 
repositories;  there is consensus that the “unknown audience” problem can best be addressed by having 
lots of different types of messages such as simple pictures, monuments, small markers, simple text, 
detailed text and complex technical archives. Some have also suggested that oral traditions and stories 
can be as effective, or more effective, than written messages in passing information from generation to 
generation.  
 
At Giant Mine, a messaging system might involve simple warning signs and text messages imploring 
people not to damage the thermosyphons, with more detailed technical information on how to replace 
this equipment when necessary and maintain other facilities such as the water treatment plant. Unlike 
nuclear waste, it is possible that the arsenic threat might be removed within a relative short period of 
time (a matter of decades rather than the centuries it takes for nuclear waste to decay), so the emphasis 
might be on “relaying” information on how to maintain the site to people roughly a century from now.  
 
Much of the work on communicating with future generations in the field of nuclear waste was 
completed by experts, but we suggest that a community working group would provide a crucial forum 
for input on the issue from residents of Yellowknife, Ndilo, and Dettah.    
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Background: Why Think about the Future? 
 
For a more than a century, the production of energy, materials and industrial products throughout the 
globe have produced large quantities of chemical and radioactive waste. Toxic material may be released 
through many means, including the production of waste rock (often laden with toxins such as heavy 
metals) during mining processes, chemical waste during factory production, or the production of 
radioactive waste associated with nuclear energy. At many former industrial sites (or current nuclear 
waste repositories) dangerous waste products will persist for centuries, in some cases forever. These 
places raise questions about how we can communicate with people in the distant future about how to 
avoid toxic hot spots, or maintain them over long periods of time so they do not become dangerous.  
 
Giant Mine is one of these long term hot spots, a site where toxic legacies may persist for centuries, if 
not forever. The current Giant Mine Remediation Project will freeze 237,000 tons of stored underground 
arsenic as a means to reduce the threat of toxic material escaping through groundwater or into the air 
through inadvertent drilling. The plan also calls for highly contaminated soils and the roaster complex 
demolition materials to be frozen in the bottom of a pit, above one or more arsenic chambers. The 
original plan of the two project proponents—Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada 
(AANDC) and the Government of the Northwest Territories—was to leave this material underground for 
all time.  
 
The project has raised questions about how to communicate with future generations about the long 
terms hazards and perpetual care requirements at the site. The recent environmental assessment 
required that the Giant Mine remediation team think of the "frozen block" method as an interim rather 
that permanent solution to the arsenic problem, with a mandate for further research that might reveal a 
way to remove or otherwise neutralize the toxic threat within a one hundred year time frame. Whatever 
the future holds for Giant Mine—permanent frozen blocks of arsenic beneath the ground or removal of 
the material within a century—the long term nature of the project suggests a moral responsibility and 
practical management challenge to ensure that future generations have the knowledge they need to 
care for the site, and are warned of the dangers that exist at the surface and underground. There is also 
a commitment, now legally binding upon the project, that a perpetual care plan be developed for the 
long-term care and maintenance of the site. 
 
This report will highlight work that has been done on communicating with future generations about the 
hazards at permanent nuclear waste repositories, primarily at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in 
Carlsbad, New Mexico, since the 1980s. It will suggest how these lessons could be applied in the Giant 
Mine remediation project, raising key issues about imagining the future in the Yellowknife region and 
how the nuclear waste issues might be applied to the slightly different issue of long term arsenic 
storage. It is meant as a community "primer" on the issue of communicating with future generations, 
with the hope that residents of the City of Yellowknife and Yellowknives Dene First Nation, along with 
the federal and territorial governments, can apply lessons learned from WIPP to their own plans for 
perpetual care and the transfer of knowledge to the near and potentially distant future.  
 
The report was produced by the "Toxic Legacies Project," a Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council (SSHRC) funded research partnership that includes Memorial University, Lakehead University, 
Alternatives North, and the Goyatiko Language Society. We have prepared the report as backgrounder 
for local workshops and a local working group we are facilitating in order to develop a community-based 
strategy for communicating with future generations about the Giant Mine site. 
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Communicating with Future Generations: What are the Issues? 
 
Imagine Yellowknife in the year 2115, or even 3015. What would the city look like in a century or 1000 
years’ time? Would it be bigger than today or smaller? What kinds of economic activity would sustain 
the city? What will the climate, vegetation and wildlife be like? Will people still drive cars and fly planes, 
or will energy scarcity in the future mean a return to older forms of transportation technology? Will 
people still carry wireless devices, or will human communities in the Yellowknife area be largely cut off 
from communication with the global village as they have been in the past? What languages will people 
speak? Will they still be part of the country that is today called Canada? And the big question, of course, 
is whether people will still live in the Yellowknife area at all nearly four centuries from now. 
 
The answers to these questions are difficult if not impossible to determine, and certainly point to the 
challenge of trying to communicate long term dangers and perpetual care requirements across 
generations. The future is, in effect, a moving target: we don't know much about the audience to whom 
we are sending messages.  
 
This is not to say we shouldn't try. Though there have been some dissenting opinions about costs versus 
potential risks of communicating hazards across generations at supposedly secure underground nuclear 
repositories, few would suggest that the enormous amount of toxic material at Giant Mine represents a 
low level of risk. Given all the attention focused on Giant Mine today, it may seem unlikely that the 
underground arsenic could be forgotten. Nonetheless, people have lost track of major toxic dump sites 
established in the early to mid-twentieth century, with disastrous consequences as people build on, drill 
into, work in, or play on lands that have been contaminated decades previously. Even a few high profile 
examples of partially or wholly forgotten toxic sites suggest the potential for disaster: the infamous Love 
Canal, NY, where chemical waste dumped by Hooker Chemical 1940s was rediscovered in the 1970s 
beneath suburban homes and schools built in the 1950s; the city of Carson, CA (near Los Angeles) where 
285 houses built on the Carousel Tract sit on top of a decades-old for gotten oil dumping site formally 
used by Shell; and the Spring Valley neighbourhood near Washington, D.C., where a large chemical 
weapons production facility was closed after WWI and quickly forgotten, only to be rediscovered in 
1993, with cleanup efforts in the now-residential area continuing to the present day. Closer to 
Yellowknife, there is at least one prominent example of institutions forgetting in a short period of time. 
The Northern Frontier Visitors Centre in Yellowknife is built on discontinuous permafrost, so the building 
design required the use of piles in the ground that needed to be kept frozen.  Over a 20 year period, 
with successive managers, the knowledge of keeping the foundation frozen was lost and the building 
now requires extensive repairs.   
 
If Giant Mine becomes a long term perpetual care site, the challenges of communicating the hazard 
across multiple generations becomes much greater. Not only does the possibility of political instability 
increase the likelihood of a breakdown in management of the site, but it is far from certain that people 
hundreds, or even thousands of years in the future will understand messages we send. We know that 
languages shift over time; Old English from even 500 years ago is extremely difficult to follow for people 
today. The meaning of many monuments left by ancient societies – the Serpent Mounds in Ontario 
come to mind here – has been lost over time.  
 
At Giant, any forgetting or loss of continuity in the environmental management of the site could 
produce a range of problems. Drilling, inadvertent intrusion into the mine works (through digging, 
mining or opening of old tunnels), and large-scale mining could result in local arsenic contamination or 
damage to freezing and water pumping systems. Over long periods of time people may forget the 
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purpose of the thermosyphons (though they are themselves a kind of marker or monument to the 
future), and may damage them or fail to maintain them. All of this could result in a worst case scenario 
at Giant: melting of the frozen blocks and failure of water pumping and treatment facilities, producing 
flooding and seepage of arsenic from underground chambers. Although the government has pointed out 
it will take twenty or more years for an individual frozen chamber to melt, without active management 
or intervention the arsenic will eventually seep out and contaminate local groundwater and surface 
water for very long periods of time. As arsenic is tasteless and odourless, contamination of the local 
water could occur without people in the future knowing, especially if they have also lost the knowledge 
necessary to monitor the release of toxic material. Even if people no longer inhabit the area around 
Yellownife (assuming, perhaps, a very long-term scenario) the impact on wildlife on the land and in 
water could be catastrophic. How can governments and the Yellowknife community guard against such 
releases of toxic material from underground repositories over potentially long periods of time?  
Lessons from Nuclear Hazards: The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 
 
Although there are thousands of chemical waste sites globally that present similar long term perpetual 
care issues, our survey of the literature revealed almost no planning for communicating these challenges 
to the future. The issue has received a much more thorough airing, however, in the field of nuclear 
waste management. From the 1980s to the 2000s, the United States Department of Energy (DOE) 
engaged in a wide ranging discussion of how to communicate with future generations at the world's first 
permanent nuclear waste repository, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico. 
WIPP was built in the 1980s and opened in 1999; the DOE has since drawn on a wide range of expert 
advice to produce a comprehensive plan on communicating the hazards at WIPP up to 10,000 years in 
the future (the time period over which the radioactivity of the waste will decay). The plan will be 
implemented when the WIPP is finally sealed in approximately 75 years. Although these plans are not 
without problems, and have been subject to criticism by journalists, activists and scholars, there is still 
much we can learn from the WIPP experience.  
  
The most important general lessons can be summarized as follows: 
 
 At any given long term waste site, systems meant to directly deter intrusion or interference 
such as guards, fences, gates, etc. (what experts terms Active Institutional Controls, or 
AICs) are likely to collapse in roughly 100 years due to failures of funding and governance 
structures; 
 More likely to be effective are deterrents to intrusion that do not require maintenance, 
generally warnings that use signs, symbols, and text, with more detailed information held in 
an archive (these are called Passive Institutional Controls, or PICs); 
 Plans to communicate with future generations should include some imagining of what that 
future might be like so as to best determine what kinds of intrusion threats different futures 
might present; 
 Because it is difficult to imagine the future, however, plans to communicate hazard over a 
long period of time should rely on multiple ways of conveying danger (text, images, 
multiple languages, monuments, stories and oral traditions, etc.) organized into a coherent 
system of communication. 
 
This report will highlight all of these issues, providing background and ideas for approaches that might 
be adopted or adapted to the circumstances at the Giant Mine site. The report will begin with a 
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discussion of key differences between nuclear repositories and the dangers of the underground arsenic 
repository at Giant Mine. It will then briefly describe the general issues and threats associated with the 
different future scenarios imagined in the WIPP project. Most importantly, the report will describe the 
specific plans for communicating with future generations about the hazards at WIPP, and point in a 
general way to how a similar system of layered message might be developed for Giant Mine. Finally, the 
report touches very briefly on some of the practical challenges that must be considered when actually 
implementing plans to commemorate hazardous sites for future generations.  
Arsenic Versus Nuclear Waste: How the Material Can Shape the Message 
 
At first glance, the arsenic problem at Giant Mine seems very similar to that of long term nuclear waste 
storage. In both cases, large amounts of toxic material are stored underground, potentially over 
unimaginably long periods of time, and in both cases inadvertent or intentional human-caused 
disturbance at the site (drilling, mining, intrusion, etc.) could result in the release of toxic material into 
the surrounding environment. On this basis alone, we think the work done at WIPP is relevant to the 
Giant Mine arsenic issue.  
 
However, there are significant differences between the problems of storing nuclear waste over the long 
term that will need to been taken into account when thinking about communicating the arsenic hazard 
to future generations. While it is not possible to foresee all problems and future issues, there are several 
clear distinctions between the radioactive and chemical dangers at WIPP and Giant Mine: 
 
 Nuclear waste breaks down over time, allowing regulatory authorities to target 
communication strategies to particular end points in time (1000-10,000 years), whereas the 
arsenic at Giant Mine will remain a potential threat for all eternity if new technology does 
not allow for a more permanent solution to the problem; 
 The US Department of Energy chose the site of the WIPP repository with an eye to 
minimizing threats from groundwater and geological instability; Giant Mine's underground 
arsenic was deposited through a somewhat haphazard arrangement between mine officials 
and federal bureaucrats in 1951, with almost no assessment of threats from groundwater or 
geological instability (cracking in chambers, leakage, etc.); 
 According to proponents, nuclear waste sites such as WIPP do not require perpetual care or 
monitoring once they are sealed, whereas the arsenic repository at Giant will require some 
form of human intervention for all of eternity (barring new technologies that can remove 
the arsenic threat), including water pumping and periodic replacement of the 
thermosyphons; 
 Radioactivity would spread immediately from WIPP if there is any serious physical breach of 
the repository containment structure, whereas a breach of the frozen arsenic blocks would 
only represent a potential threat if the blocks had thawed, and if groundwater enters the 
site (along with the failure of the water treatment system), or if dry arsenic dust were 
removed from or mobilized at the site. 
These four points have broad implications for the creation of long term communication strategies at 
Giant Mine.  
 
First, we do not know how far forward in time futures communications about the Giant site should be 
targeted. Is it a very, very long time (i.e., forever, assuming no technology is developed to fully 
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remediate the underground arsenic problem)? Or is it one hundred years into the future, with the idea 
that messages created today should urge people a century from now to develop new communications 
strategies that reflect the state of the site and remediation plans at that time (or, in the best case 
scenario, the arsenic problem is solved in the near future so no communication is necessary)?  Or is it 
best to try to develop both types of communications now? 
 
Second, as noted above, the WIPP communication strategy is focused squarely on stopping inadvertent 
intrusion, with technical knowledge transferred in archives primarily so that future societies can dig up 
the nuclear waste and use technologies to process the material as an energy source or transform it into 
a more benign form. While that latter point can clearly be applied to Giant, the perpetual care 
requirements associated with the arsenic chambers suggest the issue is less one of sealing off the site 
and hoping nobody intrudes, but ensuring that knowledge about these care requirements is passed as 
clearly as possible from one generation to the next. As noted above, the more passive nature of the 
nuclear waste threat allows for a communications strategy for WIPP focused on warning signs, symbols, 
monuments and text, some of these even to be buried underground as a layered defence against 
anyone trying to breach the repository. At Giant, where site intrusion likely represents less of a danger 
(because arsenic does not spread in the same way as radiation), the emphasis might be placed more on 
archives, technical documents, and simpler messages that ensure the perpetual care requirements are 
never forgotten as long as the arsenic remains a threat. In short, WIPP officials hope to warn people in 
the future away from the repository site, while at Giant Mine local communities have no option but to 
live with a toxic site, potentially exposed to its hazards for decades to come. The close proximity of 
Yellowknife, Ndilo, and Dettah to Giant Mine highlights the importance developing communication 
systems that allow the communities to manage and co-exist with the threat of a toxic waste 
repository over multiple generations.                                                                              
Thinking about the Future: Different Scenarios 
 
Impossible as it may be to peer into the future, during the WIPP process the Department of Energy 
organized several expert teams to imagine future scenarios for the southern western region of the 
United States. These teams considered everything from future political configurations—with some even 
imagining New Mexico joining a new state with the northern parts of Mexico—to the likelihood of non-
renewable resource extraction proceeding at the WIPP site.  
 
When imagining a future scenario for Giant Mine, at least some consideration should be given to 
possible social, technological, environmental, and economic changes that might occur. These in turn 
help to identify the potential threats to guard against. While the Giant Mine Remediation Team did 
provide modelling data for the impact of climate change on the frozen blocks, environmental changes 
are only one among myriad threats that future changes might bring to the site. For instance, is it 
possible that future societies might identify remaining gold deposits or other previously unvalued 
resources as economically valuable at any point in the distant future, leading to drilling or digging at the 
site? Will political change mean Canada no longer exists as a country? How then can knowledge of 
perpetual care requirements or funding remain intact for maintenance activities at the Giant Mine site? 
 
In the nuclear waste field, three broad futures have often been discussed in terms of the different level 
of threat they represent to a repository: 
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1. Western society transforms back to a low technology society based on hunting, gathering 
and small scale agriculture, reducing threats to the repository almost to nothing as no 
means to drill or dig underground exits (though such societies would be extremely 
vulnerable if the repository were breached in some unforeseen way); 
2. Western society declines to roughly 19th century levels, with the technological ability to 
breach underground repositories through mechanized digging or drilling, but without the 
technical knowledge of the nuclear waste threat or how to mitigate damage from any 
breach of the repository; 
3. Western society maintains high levels of technology, able to interpret the warning signs and 
technical documents left in a repository, thus avoiding completely or quickly able to repair 
any accidental breach. 
 
In the case of arsenic at Giant Mine, the "low tech" future scenario 1 represents a much more serious 
threat than in the case of nuclear waste. If Yellowknife is inhabited by societies that cannot understand 
the technical requirements for perpetual care and maintenance of the site, the frozen block and water 
pumping and treatment systems for the site will fail, possibly leading to contamination of the local 
environment and acute and/or chronic arsenic poisoning of local people, wildlife, and fish. As mentioned 
above, future scenario 2 presents a threat if exploration and underground development lead to a 
breach of the arsenic repositories, or a similar breakdown in the frozen blocks as occurs in scenario 1. 
As with the nuclear waste case, only scenario 3 (the persistence of technologically advanced society) 
provides reasonable assurance that the Giant Mine site will be maintained (assuming continuity of 
knowledge across generations).  
 
Undoubtedly, any future changes in Yellowknife will be more complex than the three general scenarios 
described above. Nonetheless, any planning for a communication strategy with future generations 
should consider key general questions about the future: 
 
 What are some other general scenarios to consider when thinking about the future at 
YK/Giant? 
 What social or political changes might affect the care and maintenance of Giant Mine? 
 How robust are these scenarios, under different time frames (100 years, 250 years, 500 
years)? 
 
Methods of Communication 
 
The daunting task of trying to communicate with people in the distant future is complicated by the fact 
that almost any method used carries some likelihood of failure. To compensate for these weaknesses, 
the WIPP expert teams concluded that only a system that uses many different types of communication 
is likely to succeed. If people in the future no longer understand today's languages, they proposed signs, 
symbols, and monuments will be placed to warn them away from the site. If above ground monuments 
erode, or are destroyed, underground markers and even an information centre are planned to warn 
people from intruding in the repository. In addition, WIPP experts concluded that messages should be 
replicated several times, or repeated in different ways so that the risk from the loss of one marker or 
information source is offset by the survival of others.  
 
The WIPP expert panels identified a system of communication with five different levels of complexity, 
from the simple to the more intricate.  
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 Level 1 Messages: These are meant to grab people's attention and to let them know 
something that is potentially significant at the site. At the design stages of WIPP experts 
imagined a variety of spike fields, or a sculpted landscape of "menacing earthworks." The 
final design included 32 large vertical monuments at the outer perimeter of the site, a berm 
and 16 additional monuments marking footprint of the underground repository. Buildings 
such as an information centre and the leftover "hot cell" facility will also convey the 
message that there is something potentially important about this site. 
 Level 2 Messages: These are simply messages meant to convey the idea of danger. They 
may include symbols and signs, and possibly simple text messages that warn of the danger 
of digging, intrusion, drilling, etc. At WIPP these types of messages will be engraved on the 
large surface monuments and on small subsurface disk markers. 
 Level 3 Messages: These are more complex messages, often a combination of images and 
text that provide information on the precise danger at the site, the location of underground 
workings, the size of the site, and where to avoid disturbing the ground. They also may 
convey when the nuclear waste was buried and how long it should remain undisturbed. At 
WIPP these types of messages will also be engraved on the large surface markers. 
 Level 4 Messages: These messages contain a high degree of complexity. At WIPP 
aboveground and underground information centres are planned that will include detailed 
information on the precise nature of the radioactive material, potential leakage pathways, 
the time period of its decay, the geological features and layout of the repository, the impact 
of radioactivity on human health, maps of other nuclear repository sites, and some detailed 
technical information on how and why the waste was generated. 
 Level 5 Messages: These are archives which contain technical summary manuals and if 
possible as complete a documentary record on the site as possible. This is a final stopgap 
measure that gives future societies with sufficient technology the possibility of responding 
to any problems or finding a permanent solution prior to the 10,000 year decay period. 
 
For each of these levels of communication, there are challenges and pitfalls that must be considered, 
particularly the questions of whether the messages will be understood, and whether they will last. While 
it is difficult to provide an exhaustive list of potential concerns, throughout the many WIPP reports the 
following key issues arose: 
 
 Will large-scale monuments attract rather that warn people away from the site? 
 Will future societies understand the symbols employed as signs of danger, especially 
considering how the meaning of signs such as the skull and crossbones and the swastika 
have changed very rapidly within our own time? 
 What languages should be employed at the site and how can we account for the fact that 
languages change rapidly over time (i.e., the English spoken in the 14th century Canterbury 
Tales is difficult to understand today)? 
 What materials should be used to construct monuments and signs at the site? 
 What media should be used to preserve archival records about the site?  
 
These issues were addressed through several measures and conceptual design approaches for the site: 
 
 For the first two questions, the potential for misinterpretation was addressed through the 
idea of a system of different signs, symbols, and text, with the hope that people in the 
future might understand at least one of them;  
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 For languages, WIPP experts decided to use the six official United Nations languages 
(English, Spanish, French, Russian, Standard Chinese, and Arabic) and also Navajo to address 
the local First Nation in the region;  
 Textual messages should include a "relay statement" asking people in the future to translate 
text if it starts to seem archaic and hence become difficult to understand; 
 After several studies of what materials might prove most durable at the site, experts 
identified granite as the most long-lasting of rock types, though various types of cement 
could also be used; 
 Marker messages should be engraved directly rather than mounted on plaques (which could 
be removed) or painted (which would not last long enough); 
 Records should be kept on the most durable forms of paper; other technologies such as 
microfilm are subject to decay and digital technology undergoes rapid format changes over 
time (try finding a machine in which to insert a floppy disk!). 
  
If you would like to see some of the images and textual messages that the various WIPP artists and 
conceptual teams developed at various stages, there are three online collections (web addresses are 
also in the source list at the end of the document): 
 
 First WIPP Web Page 
http://www.wipp.energy.gov/PICsProg/articles/WIPP%20Exhibit%20Message%20to%201
2,000%20A_D.htm 
 Early conceptual images for permanent markers and symbols – prior to 1996 (click on the 
“early concepts” image [a field of spikes] to download the collection at 
http://www.wipp.energy.gov/picsprog/pics_images.htm) 
 Conceptual Design Drawings 
http://www.wipp.energy.gov/PICsProg/Test1/Conceptual_PM_design_images.pdf 
 
One issue that WIPP experts dismissed was the use of oral tradition, suggesting that stories, legends and 
myths were too subject to change over time to be a reliable means of intergenerational communication. 
Yellowknives Dene First Nations members (and indigenous people more broadly) have a different 
perspective, however, suggesting that oral tradition has been a primary and reliable means of passing 
knowledge from generation to generation for thousands of years in their communities. As the next 
section suggests, there are other issues arising from the local realities and context for any strategy to 
communicate with future generations at Giant Mine.  
Implementing a Strategy at Giant Mine 
 
As noted above, the arsenic problem at Giant Mine is a unique product of local geology, the pollution 
control methods used at the mine, and the decision to store arsenic trioxide dust underground with 
little thought for short- and long-term consequences. The ground under Giant Mine became a long term 
toxic waste repository without any input or decision making power from those who live in and near 
Yellowknife. In a similar way, the arsenic on site has the potential to threaten future generations who 
had no part in the decision to store the material underground, and no part in the decision to freeze the 
arsenic chambers, possibly for all time.  
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A well-planned strategy to communicate the presence of underground arsenic, and to ensure knowledge 
about the perpetual care requirements persists across generations, offers at least some hope that 
actions today can minimize the burden that Giant Mine places on the people of the near and distant 
future. As development of the communication strategy moves forward, there are several key issues that 
specific to the arsenic problem, Giant Mine, and Yellowknife, that should be addressed. We suggest the 
following points and questions for consideration: 
 
 No matter how many warnings are placed at the Giant Mine site, there is no escaping the fact 
that the frozen block, water pumping, and water treatment systems will fail if the funding and 
knowledge necessary to maintain the site are disrupted; 
 The strategy to communicate with future generations should therefore be intimately tied to 
perpetual care planning, and needs to focus more on the issue of transferring knowledge over 
time rather than simply abandoning the repository with warning signs; 
 The issue of long term funding is central to perpetual care funding and a strategy to 
communicate with future generations, and may require special arrangements such as a trust 
fund (Measure 6 of the Giant Mine Remediation Project environmental assessment mandated 
investigation of long term funding options while Suggestion 5 recommends the creation of an 
independent trust fund to provide multi-year funding); 
 The potential long-term nature of the arsenic problem may require novel institutional 
arrangements, possibly a some sort of stewardship foundation that provides an alternative site 
management authority to the potential instability of governments and funding; 
 The perpetual care requirements at Giant suggest that the preservation of records and technical 
manuals, along with simpler messages that highlight how to maintain the site, may be more 
important than warnings signs and symbols; 
 The clusters of thermosyphons will already form a series of monuments (a bit like the spiky 
fields mentioned above) and some thought on how to communicate the purpose and 
maintenance requirements of these features is critical; 
 Several WIPP experts proposed the idea of a “nuclear priesthood” a quasi-religious institution 
that would develop rituals and rites devoted to communication of radioactive hazard. Should 
similarly novel institutional arrangements be part of the strategy to communicate with future 
generations at Giant Mine? 
 Given the First Nations cultural context, how can oral tradition and local languages be mobilized 
as part of the strategy to communicate with future generations? What myths, legends, and 
stories could be developed to help warn people about the dangers and the necessary care 
requirements at Giant Mine? 
 While the WIPP experts thought in terms of communicating with people over vast time periods 
(up to 10,000 years), does the perpetual care scenario at Giant suggest a relay system, where 
communications strategies focus on 100-200 year time periods, with explicit instructions to 
adapt and change the communications system as circumstances change? 
 
These questions and issues represent a daunting challenge that reflects the magnitude and complexity 
of the arsenic threat at Giant Mine. Because of this, we do not provide a prescriptive roadmap for 
communicating with the future. Although the WIPP process was driven by expert knowledge, we believe 
that the Giant Mine strategy should be developed through a community-based process that accounts for 
the diverse interests in the Yellowknife region (First Nations, Métis, municipal government, concerned 
citizens, etc.). We envision a working group that will identify key issues and possible pathways forward 
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on the issue communicating with future generations. As a starting point, we suggest that the working 
group consider adopting a four stage process that addresses the following issues:  
 
1. Envision future scenarios, with an emphasis on social and political conditions; 
2. Highlight problems, challenges and issues related to methods of communication for 
explaining the toxic threat of Giant Mine to future generations; 
3. Consider key messaging strategies as part of a system of communication for Giant site;  
4. Propose an implementation strategy for the Giant Mine messaging system. 
 
In turn, the implementation of this strategy will require “buy in” from federal government (and possibly 
territorial government authorities) who can mobilize expertise (designers, engineers, etc.) and funding.  
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improbable scenarios such as a battleship full of returning human warriors crashing into and/or firing lasers at 
the WIPP cite. The report also mention the possibility for a fictional character such as “Mickey Nuke” to 
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Human Interference Task Force. 1984. Reducing the likelihood of future human activities that could affect 
geologic high-level waste repositories: Technical report. Prepared for the Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation, 
Battelle Memorial Institute.  
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McKinley, I. G., and R. Munier. 2003. Discussion of “In absurdum: Long-term predictions and nuclear waste 
handling”: By N.A. Mörner (vol. 61, pp. 75–82). Engineering Geology 68(3–4) (3): 401-3.  
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C o m m u n i c a t i n g  D a n g e r   P a g e  | 17 
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Much of this book is devoted to the WIPP case study. While thoughtful and useful on many levels, the volume 
is composed with extremely dense and theoretical academic language.  
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An archived version of the first WIPP website on communicating with future generations, the document 
contains interesting images and text – a good summary of early thinking on the issue.  
Waste Isolation Pilot Project. Conceptual Design Drawings. http://www.wipp.energy.gov/PICsProg/Test1/ 
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